The Dilemma

The news of de escalation by both Indian and Chinese armies along the lines of Pangong Tso has been a ray of hope after nine long months of military standoff despite the frostbitten winters of the Himalayas. As per Rajnath Singh, the Defense Minister of India, the retreat of the armed forces would be carried out in a “phased, coordinated and verified manner” but whether to status quo ante or not, is still unclear, so is the future of the current dispute.

Ever since the surprise attack by 80000 armed Chinese military on an aghast, seemingly unprepared and excruciatingly outnumbered 10000 Indian soldiers on the eve of 1962, the tensions regarding the exact location of LAC (Line of Actual Control) has been prevalent. The issue emerging as a result of the lack of formal verified documents seemingly accounting for the borders during the British colonial times has now developed like an infested wound, spewing blood in every few years. Added to that is the Chinese technological and infrastructural advancements made in the Ladakh region in the form of stable roads which enable better communication.

With the significant decline of the US hegemony in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, China’s road to executing its Marshall Plan was further eased. This was followed by Xi Jinping ascending to power in 2012 which made the Chinese quit their ‘Hide and Bide’ policy and the truculent behavior with the neighbouring island countries gradually surfaced. History has it, that the Chinese, owing to their domestic political system and its decadent reputation in the western world, has largely been insecure about its sovereignty (which is why rise in Indo Tibet tensions is equivalent of souring Sino- Indian relations). The ageing of difference of perception regarding LAC, the simultaneous economic growth and defence power and China’s expansionist policies over the years have cumulatively added to the latter’s urge to dominate global politics, making conflict resolution all the more difficult and subservient. The Covid 19 acted as the final nail in the coffin of US leadership on the world forum and China, only too eager to seize the opportunity, entered the scene to supersede US hegemony of liberal internationalism with its very own version of aggressive hierarchical authoritarian foreign policies.

The turn of 21st century has witnessed the steady shift of the centre of gravity of world politics to Asia and in more recent times, specifically to Indo Pacific. The US sees India as a plausible swing state to revert back the balance of power in US’s favour, while China, apprehensive of the growing US-India bonhomie, tries to keep India in check by applying a policy of engagement wherein it partners with India regarding less strategically substantial but convergent issues of interest like the climate accords while also trying to contain the latter by playing the Pakistan card wherever necessary. As the recently translated and published IAF documents read, the Chinese attitude towards India has mostly been dismissive. India has gained ample importance in the Chinese academia mostly when US India trade relations and other trade pacts like the QUAD are concerned. But of late the increasingly resolute image of the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi as a bold leader successfully sparking waves of ultranationalism throughout the country, the consequent counter attacks over Uri and Pulwama with the Indian jingoist media tuning in with the same note of ‘Akhand Bharat’ seem to have reasonably raised Chinese suspicions regarding Tibet, POK and Aksai Chin, the latter two forming a vital part of the prestigious CPEC (China Pakistan Economic Corridor)project China has in mind for futher dominance on Asia as a whole. The sudden takeover of J&K by the central administration of India and its latter initiatives of constructing border roads, seem to have acted as catalysts for Chinese skepticism over losing their sovereignty and the expansion of the Chinese hegemony, with the immediate trigger probably being the construction of the Galwan nullah.

This further builds up another very plausible trigger drawn out by experts and analysts which concerns the maritime interests of both the powers in the South China Sea. India had upped its naval missions in the last few years. During the Covid 19 pandemic the previous year, Mission SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) was launched to provide assistance to the island nations of Maldives, Mauritius and the likes. China has embarked on a massive military expansion, shy of the most powerful navy in the world title only by US. But even with all its shiny warships and maritime militia, so far as the current situations unfold, India still holds a strategical and tactical edge owing to its geographical location and the global perception regarding China’s agenda. Should any full fledged war take place tomorrow, India does have reason to believe that it will have an upperhand over the Chinese in maritime domain, along with leverage of the Malaccan straits and international support which does not seem to fare very well for China since its own allies are more often than not liabilities along with its internal issues acting as an added burden.

The other major threat that India faces directly is in the nuclear arms forum. China became a nuclear superpower long before India, in the year 1964. Pakistan, conveniently borrowed Weapons of Mass Destruction (read Mutually Assured Destruction) from China and became a super power in 1990 putting India under immense pressure to achieve nuclear deterrence by becoming a nuclear power in the year 1998. So the chronology of arming oneself to teeth before one’s neighbor did was against India’s interest resulting in a significant number of terror attacks in the country by Pakistan’s terrorist groups which basked under the inflated pride of possessing nuclear armaments by the Pakistani government. Similarly the Chinese too have kept testing the waters with continued periodic incursions resulting in the clashes in Daulat Beg Old, Chumar, Doklam and the most recent Galwan valley. India for the most part applied the policy of hedging in response, combining a mixed approach of nuclear deterrence, summit level and diplomatic talks and economic trade sanctions.

However this time India remarkably turned the tables by acquiring the strategic advantage of climbing the mountain ranges, imposing the FDI and import restrictions along with rejecting the RCEP on the eleventh hour. All of these moves collectively send out a resilient message to the Chinese intellegensia that India would not compromise on territorial integrity and the previous Modus Vivendi is no longer viable subsequently requiring new rules of engagement to be framed in order to protect and preserve sovereignty of both the nations. China too is perhaps coming to terms with the losses it encountered thus far, in the form of further alienation in the global arena, casualties caused to its military, public disdain along with fortifying US india ties by a considerable margin.

The gradual, pragmatic salami slicing tactics by China on the LAC has resulted multiple friction points by now, making it increasingly resemble the LOC which might translate into shortlived tactical gains for China, in the sense that India for the time being atleast, cannot patrol as far as it used to, but the probable long term advantage is yet unclear. The only aspect of the future of the Indo China dilemma that receives minimum debate is the dominance of geotechnological competition. Both the countries’ defense budgets have already witnessed a surge and the same is evident in nearly all of the politically significant countries of the world. A new arm’s race might as well be on its way, albeit the arms might not necessarily be physical this time, and if it does, the future of international realpolitik would be a technologically determined delicate balance of global alignments rather than alliances.

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